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Abstract This paper investigates how changes in regulatory and economic environments
affect the transparency of banks’ financial-statements. Reregulation and a volatile economy
make Turkish banks the ideal sample. I disaggregate sources of both hidden and booked
capital in Turkish banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange between 1988 and 2006.
Hidden capital account for the difference between the accounting and opportunity-cost
measures of a firm’s net worth. Increases in hidden capital in crisis periods indicate a
greater reliance on government-contributed safety-net capital. The increase in hidden capital
is more pronounced for large banks. Too-Big-To-Fail policies may explain why large banks
are the beneficiaries of government-contributed capital.
Keywords Transparency . Financial safety net . Turkish financial crisis
1 Introduction
This paper investigates how changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the
transparency of financial statements. Financial statements are transparent only when
stakeholders can access all relevant information to price financial institutions in a timely
fashion (Kane 2004; Vishwanath and Kaufmann 2001). Stakeholders of commercial banks
are: shareholders who provide stock-capital, depositors and creditors who contribute debt-
capital, borrowers who cultivate relationships with banks to meet financing needs,
government regulators who enhance credit-worthiness of banks through implicit and
explicit safety-nets, and taxpayers who may end up financing the safety nets.
Incentive conflicts between management, which prepares financial statements, and
stakeholders, who rely on statements to accurately value firms, mean that management may
misrepresent, conceal, and/or delay information (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Kane 1989;
Saunders et al. 1990). Kane (2004) defines financial disinformation as statements that are
configured to hinder less-informed stakeholders from discerning the full-information value
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of an enterprise. Management propagates financial disinformation to delay dissemination of
unfavorable information and discloses favorable information accurately and promptly. The
asymmetry between the timeliness of favorable and unfavorable information means that
sudden large downward movements in prices are more likely than upward movements. An
economy-wide crisis occurs when financial disinformation is revealed and there are large
downward movements in prices.
Stakeholders learn of the depletion in shareholder-contributed capital when financial
disinformation is revealed. This revelation necessitates new infusions of shareholder-capital
and/or an increased reliance on implicit and explicit forms of government guarantees. The
benefits accruing from safety nets cannot be booked whereas capital raised from
shareholders can be. Consequently, relying on government-contributed capital instead of
raising capital from shareholders would decrease transparency. This paper tracks time-series
changes in economic activity to investigate changes in transparency and sources of
opaqueness in statements.
The Turkish banking industry provides a fruitful setting in which to investigate how
changes in regulatory and economic environments affect the transparency of commercial
banks. In the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish regulators passed a series of regulations that
transformed how banks conducted business. (Selçuk and Ertuğrul 2001; Alper and Öniş
2003; Damar 2004; Öniş and Bakır 2007). Turkish economy also proved volatile in the
same period (Kibritçioğlu 2001).
This paper sheds light on how the current subprime-mortgage crisis affects emerging-
market countries. Emerging-market countries do not have as developed mortgage markets,
and their banks do not use securitization as often as banks in the US or Western Europe. As
such, securitization and mortgage-backed securities should not pose the same problems in
emerging markets as they do in US and developed markets. However, greater integration in
the world economy, the global recession and the credit crunch is affecting emerging-market
countries that need to finance their growth. The sub-prime mortgage crisis has caught banks
and borrowers of emerging markets with short positions in foreign currencies and a sizable
need to roll-over. Net private flows to emerging economies are forecasted to be $165 billion
USD in 2009 down from $929 billion in 2007 (Institute of International Finance 2009). The
stage for a global crisis spilling over to emerging-market economies is set. How well
regulators meet the demands set forth by the crisis remains to be seen. Banks in emerging
markets have large foreign currency positions and have gone through similar deregulatory
phases as Turkish banks did. The experience of Turkish banks and regulators in the 1994
and 2001 crises may enhance our understanding of how the current crisis affects emerging
markets.
I adapt Kane and Ünal’s (1990) statistical market-value accounting model (SMVAM) to
disaggregate sources of capital in Turkish banks traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange
(ISE) using data from 1988 to 2006. SMVAM uses regression analysis to partition the
market value of a firm’s stock into two components: booked capital-reserves and unbooked
(or hidden) capital. Hidden capital accounts for the difference between the accounting and
market-value measures of a firm’s net worth. Hidden capital is divided into two parts. The
first part consists of the values that are unbooked but which might be registered through
asset sales and subsequent write-downs in a historical-cost balance sheet using Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The second part comprises the values that are
unbooked and which GAAP deems to be intangible off-balance-sheet items.
Hidden capital proves to be a significant component of net worth. Furthermore, hidden
capital is significantly larger in crisis periods than it is in non-crisis periods. Heavier
reliance on government-contributed capital prior and during periods of crisis may explain
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the significant surges in hidden capital. The largest four banks in the sample, which account
for 48% of Turkish banking assets1, are more likely to benefit from implicit government
guarantees than are the small banks. A policy of Too-Big-To-Fail, where the government is
expected to not let large banks fail, increases shareholder wealth by decreasing financing
costs (O’Hara and Shaw 1990). I conjecture that the four large banks were deemed Too-
Big-To-Fail and enjoyed the benefits from implicit and explicit safety nets.
During the sample period, Turkish banks categorized foreign-currency related derivative
transactions as off-balance-sheet transactions. Banks had the leeway to engage in these
transactions without having to set aside shareholder-contributed capital. Short positions in
foreign currencies attained using derivative products coupled with devaluation in the
Turkish lira in crisis periods, such as in 1994 and 2001, might have generated a need for
infusions of capital. Banks may raise capital from shareholders, or, in the form of heavier
reliance on implicit and explicit safety nets from the government.
Results indicate a heavier reliance on government-provided capital in crisis periods.
Furthermore, I find no significant increase in shareholder-contributed capital in crisis
periods relative to non-crisis periods. Regulators instituted full deposit-insurance coverage
following the crises in 1994 and 2001. The regulatory choice to increase government-
provided guarantees points to a need for and a realization of increased reliance on
government-provided capital.
The Turkish experience in the crises of 1994 and 2001 indicates that banks rely on
government-contributed capital more than they do on shareholder-contributed capital. One
immediate response to crisis is to introduce full-deposit insurance to restore investor
confidence. However, full-deposit insurance distorts the risk-taking incentives of banks and
introduces moral hazard problems. Banks can increase the value derived from deposit
insurance by increasing asset volatility (Merton 1977). Grossman (1992) shows how
financial institutions covered by deposit insurance operating under relatively more
permissive regulatory environments tend to carry out riskier lending than their more tightly
regulated counterparts do. The introduction of blanket guarantees in the 1994 and 2001
crises indicates that Turkish regulators did not establish risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible
safety nets. The cost of providing capital to unhealthy banks through implicit and explicit
guarantees was ultimately borne by healthy banks and the Turkish taxpayer.
Reliance on government guarantees and Too-Big-to-Fail policies make financial
statements opaque. Opaqueness in financial statements impairs the ability of regulators
and taxpayers to distinguish between troubled and healthy banks. Kane (1997) explains
how transparency is crucial in controlling incentive conflicts between regulators, regulated
institutions, and taxpayers. Regulated institutions have incentives to hide adverse
information from regulators and the general public. Regulators, as self-interested agents
that serve society and private sector interests, are often the targets of influence peddling
from regulated institutions. This is why transparency of financial statements is vital for
regulators to monitor regulated institutions and for taxpayers to evaluate the performance of
regulators.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 1 develops the research
design. Section 2 reports the results of the tests of hypotheses. Finally, Section 3 concludes
the paper.
1 The figure is as of 2006 and the data is available from The Banks Association of Turkey.
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2 Research design
2.1 Hypotheses and design of tests
I use SMVAM to operationalize transparency. Transparency of financial statements means
that stakeholders (depositors, creditors, investors, regulators, taxpayers, borrowers, and
bankers) can rely on statements to judge the health of banks. In a perfectly transparent
world, market value (the “true” economic value of the bank) would exactly coincide with
book value. A stakeholder would work out the value of any bank by looking into its books.
SMVAM2 develops separate estimates for the bookable and unbookable components of
the market value of a banking firm. Market value of net worth (MV) is the product of share
price and the number of shares outstanding. Market value can also be thought of as the sum
of the market value of bookable and unbookable assets minus the sum of market value of
bookable and unbookable liabilities.
Banks carry bookable assets and liabilities at historical costs; therefore, current values
cannot be directly observed. Assuming that investors estimate the market value of bookable
equity by using appropriate mark-up (or markdown in the cases of downward adjustment)
ratios (ka and kl respectively) to the accounting values, the below equation is obtained:
MVit ¼ Uþ ka*Ait þ kl*Lit þ eit; ð1Þ
where,
Au
: Unbookable assets, Lu: Unbookable liabilities,
U = Au - Lu : Hidden capital, Ait: Bookable assets of bank i at time t,
Lit: Bookable liabilities of bank i at time t, ka: Mark-up ratio for bookable assets,
kl: Mark-up ratio for bookable liabilities, eit: Error term of bank i at time t.
Banks report some transactions that may affect net worth in footnotes that accompany
the financial statements. These off-balance-sheet transactions include loan commitments,
standby letters of credit, and foreign-currency-related and interest-rate-related derivative
contracts. The Turkish lira steadily depreciated against all foreign currencies as a result of
persistent inflation in the last two decades. The volatility in the exchange rate has also been
high. Any bank with large short-positions or long-positions in foreign currencies faced
foreign-exchange risk. This is why I introduce foreign-currency-related derivative
contracts3 into Eq. (1).
MVit ¼ Uþ ka*Ait þ kl*Lit þ kFX*FXit þ eit; ð2Þ
where FXit is foreign-currency-related derivative transactions and kFX is the mark-up ratio
investors apply to these transactions.
Cross-sectional differences in bank size and time-series differences in economic activity
may affect estimates of SMVAM. First, bank size may affect the competitive environment
and how regulatory authorities treat banks (O’Hara and Shaw 1990; DeYoung et al. 2004;
2 Kane and Ünal (1990), Kane, Ünal, and Demirgüç-Kunt 1991, and Kane and Wilson 2002 apply SMVAM
to disaggregate the sources of capital for a sample: of US banks from 1975-1985, of Japanese banks from
1975–1989, and of US and Canadian banks from 1893–1992, respectively.
3 Foreign-currency related derivative contracts include foreign-exchange forward contracts, swap contracts,
foreign exchange and interest-rate option contracts, and interest-rate futures contracts.
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Berger et al. 2004). As a result, SMVAM estimates of markup ratios and hidden capital may
differ for small and large banks. Second, bank management has incentives to conceal and
delay dissemination of adverse information. In financial crisis when accumulated adverse
information is revealed, investors may value bank assets differently (Kane 2001, 2004).
This is why SMVAM estimates in crisis periods may differ from estimates in non-crisis
periods.
I use the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) framework4 to estimate SMVAM for
large and small banks. Market capitalizations of small and large banks are regressed on
their book values of assets, liabilities and foreign-exchange-related derivative transactions.
Interaction terms between the variables and a crisis indicator control for differences in
estimates in normal times and times of crisis. I estimate the following system of equations
using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS):
MVS;it ¼ US þ ka;S*AS;it þ kl;S*LS;it þ kFX;S*FXS;it þ US;crisis*Icrisis þ ka;S;crisis*
AS;it*Icrisis þ kl;S;crisis*LS;it*Icrisis þ kFX;S;crisis*FXS;it*Icrisis þ eS;it;
MVL;it ¼ UL þ ka;L*AL;it þ kl;L*LL;it þ kFX;L*FXL;it þ UL;crisis*Icrisis þ ka;L;crisis
*AL;it*Icrisis þ kl;L;crisis*LL;it*Icrisis þ kFX;L;crisis*FXL;it*Icrisis þ eL;it
ð3Þ
Icrisis is an indicator for crisis periods. The subscripts “S”, “L”, “S, crisis”, and “L, crisis”
stand for small banks, large banks, small banks in crisis periods, and large banks in crisis
periods, respectively.
Hidden capital would not exist in a perfectly transparent world. In a sense, the extent to
which unbooked equity (U) deviates from zero and the mark-up ratios (k) deviate from
unity is an inverse measure of transparency. I expect some opaqueness in financial
statements due to the leeway that GAAP grants managers in how they report bank
activities. I test the following hypothesis of transparency for each group of banks:
Hypothesis 1 Financial statements are transparent.
ðUn ¼ 0 and ka;n ¼ 1 and kl;n ¼ 1; n ¼ S;L in normal times
Un þ Un; crisis ¼ 0 and ka;n þ ka;n;crisis ¼ 1 and kl;n þ k1;n;crisis ¼ 1; in times of crisisÞ
Next, I test the hypotheses that cross-sectional differences in bank size and time-series
differences in economic activity may affect SMVAM estimates. First, I test whether banks
raise capital either from shareholders or from the government in crisis periods. In times of
financial crisis, managers cannot avoid/delay dissemination of adverse information.
Revelation of adverse information lowers asset prices. Consequently, banks need to raise
capital either from shareholders or from government regulators.
Hypothesis 2 Banks raise capital neither from shareholders nor from government regulators
in crisis periods.
Second, I test the hypothesis that large and small banks operate and report their
operations in inherently different ways. If the data confirms the hypothesis, SMVAM
estimates of large and small banks should prove different. Even if small and large banks
operate and report their operations in similar ways, Too-Big-To-Fail policies might cause a
4 In designing the SUR framework, I benefited from the methodology of Ünal et al. (1993) who develop a
SUR model to measure market reactions to announcements of the Brady plan and the Mexican-debt
reduction.
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difference in how regulators treat small and large banks. If regulatory authorities treat banks
of different sizes in dissimilar ways, SMVAM estimates of small and large banks would be
different.
Hypothesis 3 SMVAM estimates of small banks and large banks are equal.
UL ¼ US and ka;L ¼ ka;S and kl;L ¼ k1;S in normal times

UL þ UL;crisis ¼ Us þ US;crisis and ka;L þ ka;L;crisis ¼ ka;S þ ka;S;crisis and kl;L
þ ki;L;crisis ¼ kl;S þ kL;L;cirsis in times of crisisÞ
2.2 The choice of Turkish banks
Reregulation and a volatile economy make Turkish banks ideal to investigate how changes
in regulation and economic environment affect transparency of financial institutions. I first
summarize the regulatory changes that alter the operation of Turkish banks in the sample
period. I then discuss the economic environment.
In the early 1980s, financial liberalization caused major structural changes in the Turkish
economy5. Before financial liberalization, Turkey followed a strict, domestic-market-
oriented, high-tariff-protected development strategy. In accordance with this strategy, the
government determined interest rates. Regulation imposed high entry and exit costs to the
banking sector. Development plans defined the objective of financial institutions as raising
capital needed for investment in “high-priority” industries. Starting in 1980, the
administration adopted a new development strategy based on “free market” notions of
competition. As a result of financial liberalization, banks were able to set interest rates on
deposits they attracted and on the credit they supplied.
The new political economy brought in by financial liberalization created the need for a
deposit insurance system. Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (TMSF or Savings Deposit
Insurance Fund), which laid the foundation for the current deposit insurance system, was
established in 1983. TMSF guaranteed up to three million TL (approximately 57,000 in
2006 YTL or 40,000 in 2006 USD6) of time deposits. Subsequent laws revised the fund’s
organization, insurance coverage, premiums level and structure of the premiums system.
Following the economic crisis of April 1994, the board of government ministers passed a
law that mandated unlimited insurance on all TL and foreign-currency deposits (effective 5
April 1994). Regulators limited insurance coverage to fifty billion TL (approximately
193,000 in 2006 YTL or 137,000 in 2006 USD) as of 1 June 2000. Limited insurance
coverage was short-lived. In the wake of the 2000 crisis, regulators reinstated full insurance
coverage on 15 January 2001. For 10 years starting in 1994, except for six months in 2000,
Turkish depositors enjoyed government guarantees on all their deposits. Effective July 5
2004, insurance coverage was limited to fifty billion TL (approximately 62,000 in 2006
YTL or 44,000 in 2006 USD) and remains limited to 50 thousand new TL to this day7.
5 Selçuk and Ertuğrul (2001), Damar (2004), and The Banks Association of Turkey (1998) describe and
discuss the financial liberalization program in detail.
6 Turkish currency prior to January 1 2006 is Turkish lira (TL). Turkey deleted six zeros in the Turkish lira as
of January 1 2005 and the new currency is labeled Yeni Turkish lira (YTL). We use World Bank (available at
http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline) data series on consumer price index (CPI) and official exchange
rate from Central Bank of Turkey to deflate to 2006 YTL and convert to US dollars.
7 Alparslan et. al. (2000) and The Banks Association of Turkey (2001) discuss the evolution of the Saving
Deposit Insurance Fund.
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Starting in the late eighties and continuing through the nineties, chronically high
inflation and government borrowing changed bank incentives. First, high government
borrowing meant that banks lent as intensively to the government as to firms and
individuals. Investments in liquid assets proved as important as investments in loans
throughout the 1990s. Second, faced with high inflation, depositors began to favor foreign-
currency deposits. At 1993 year-end, the ratio of deposits and borrowings to assets proved
to be 77% for banks with no government ownership. Foreign-currency deposits and
borrowings constituted 66 and 91% of all deposits and borrowings, respectively. Banks
financed their investments in TL-denominated government-debt and loans through deposits
and borrowings mainly denominated in foreign currencies8.
The strategy of investing in TL assets financed by foreign-currency deposits and
borrowing would expose banks to foreign-exchange risk. Foreign-currency denominated
liabilities proved larger than assets throughout the 1990s and, so far, the 2000s. In the
absence of proper hedging, any depreciation in the Turkish lira would hurt bank equity. In
the 5 days following April 4 1994 TL devalued by 48% against the USD9. Three banks
(TYT bank, Marmarabank and Impexbank) declared bankruptcy and were closed by the
TMSF on 11 April 1994.
The Turkish government instigated full insurance coverage to reinstate confidence in the
banking system. Full insurance coverage and International Monetary Fund (IMF) aid
forestalled troubles in the short run. However, Müslümov (2005), Soral et al. (2006) Önder
and Özyıldırım (2008) study how full-deposit insurance may have contributed to excessive
risk taking and fraud. Müslümov (2005) finds that banks that are more likely to be subject
to moral hazard show significant increases in foreign-exchange risk and deterioration in
capital adequacy. Önder and Özyıldırım (2008) find that despite the presence of generous
deposit insurance, borrowers and depositors punished risky banks. Soral et al. (2006)
document how full-deposit insurance might have contributed to the looting of Esbank.
Investments in TL-denominated assets financed by foreign-currency-denominated
liabilities remained unchecked following the 1994 crisis. Moral hazard problems caused
by full deposit-insurance coupled with the vulnerability of banks to depreciation in the TL
may have set up the stage for the problems banks faced after 1994.
East Asian currency crisis started in Thailand in July 1997 (TL depreciated by 7.52%
against the USD in this month) and spread to the majority of East Asian countries. The East
Asian crisis continued to unfold in 1998 and may have contributed to the Russian crisis
which started in August 1998 (the TL depreciated by 2.71% in this month) (Berg 1999;
Kane 2000). As a developing country and a significant trade partner of Russia, Turkey
experienced repercussions in its economy and banking industry. In addition to the
contagion effect of the East Asian and Russian crises, a natural catastrophe, the İzmit
earthquake in August 1999, also significantly affected the banking industry. İzmit is located
in the Turkish industrial heartland. The earthquake caused devastating losses to human life
and real assets. Banks and insurance companies with investments and customers in this area
faced significant losses.
8 Numbers based on the aggregate data on banks provided by the The Banks Association of Turkey (http://
www.tbb.org.tr/bbts/default.aspx).
9 Devaluation in TL calculated using Turkish Central Bank bid prices (http://evds.tcmb.gov.tr/cgi-bin/
famecgi?cgi=$ozetweb&DIL=TR&ARAVERIGRUP=bie_dkdovizgn.db).
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Foreign-exchange risk combined with above mentioned factors may have contributed to
the closure of eight banks by the TMSF from November 1997 to December 1999. Two of
these eight banks, Esbank and Yaşarbank are in the sample. In the latter part of 1999, the
newly elected Turkish government set out on a course of IMF-aided economic program
focusing on decreasing inflation. This program called for strict controls on the economy as
a whole. Special emphasis was placed on reforming the banking system. Laws requiring
greater transparency were enacted.
The IMF program could not prevent a deepening of the financial crisis in late 2000. The
inability of the largest Turkish banks to cover their over-night positions in the Repo and
Reverse-Repo markets triggered another crisis (Danielsson and Saltoğlu 2003). On
February 19 2001, spurred by political uncertainty, matters worsened10. In the five trading
days following the 19th, the TL devalued by 40% against the USD and the interbank
interest rate hit highs of 6,200%. TMSF closed down eleven banks from October 2000 to
November 2001. Of these eleven banks, Demirbank and Toprakbank are in the sample.
2.3 Sampling frame
Statistical Market Value Accounting Model requires the collection of market capitaliza-
tion11, which is provided by Datastream for all the Turkish banks listed on ISE on a yearly
or quarterly basis. I exclude banks in which the government has an ownership stake since
government-owned banks have different incentives than non-government-owned banks12.
Table 1 catalogs listing and delisting dates for the sample banks. The first commercial bank
to list on the ISE was İş Bankası on January 4, 198813, and the last one was Denizbank on
September 30, 2004. Table 1 also provides data on events that significantly alter the
ownership structure of sample banks. Waves of bankruptcies and mergers mark the sample
period. Number of banks in the sample ranges from two to thirteen. Merger-announcement
dates are pulled together from files of firm news provided by ISE14. Of the banks in the
sample, the TMSF closed Marbank following the crisis in 1994, closed Esbank and
Yaşarbank following the turbulence in 1998, and closed Toprakbank and Demirbank after
the 2001 crisis. All but two of the surviving sample banks received acquisitions bids in
2005 and 2006. As shown in Table 1, all bidders except one were non-Turkish banks.
Türkiye Bankacılar Birliği (The Banks Association of Turkey or TBB) provides
financial statements on an annual basis until 1996 and on a quarterly basis from 1997. I
compile a dataset containing the book value of assets and liabilities from annual and
quarterly balance sheets. I also collect data on off-balance-sheet items reported in the
footnotes. The sample period is a time of high inflation, which ranged from 74% in 1988 to
10 Press articles cite a public argument between the president and the prime minister as the culprit for
political uncertainty and catalyst for the crisis (Milliyet 2001).
11 Datastream defines market capitalization as common shares outstanding multiplied by share price.
12 None of the sample banks is an Islamic financial institution since no Islamic bank is listed on the ISE.
Islamic financial institutions entered the Turkish financial services industry in 1985 and account for one to
three percent of all deposits from 1991 to 2001. Interested readers may refer to Jang (2005) for the evolution
of Islamic banking in Turkey.
13 İş Bankası lists three different shares (type A, B, and C). A, B, and C shares command common voting
and control rights. A and B shares receive preferential treatment in dividend payouts (http://www.isbank.
com.tr/yatirimci/yi-imtiyazli.html). We sum up the market capitalization for the three types of shares listed on
ISE to calculate market capitalization of İş Bankası. İş Bankası type A shares were listed on the ISE on
February 5,1988, type B shares on January 4, 1988, and type C shares on August 19, 1991.
14 Files containing firm news can be accessed at http://www.imkb.gov.tr/sirkethaberleri.htm.
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9% in 2006, with a low of 8% and a high of a 106%. As such, I deflate all data items using
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) provided by World Bank. All items are in December 2006
million YTL.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on market-capitalization, book values of assets and
liabilities, and foreign-exchange-related off-balance-sheet items15. Four banks − namely, İş
Bankası, Akbank, Garanti Bankası and Yapı Kredi Bankası − prove the largest in terms of
market capitalization and asset size. The average market capitalization for the largest four
banks is 7,909 million YTL whereas it is 688 million YTL for the remaining banks. In the
analysis, SVMAM estimates of these large four banks will be allowed to differ from the
estimates of small banks.
I adopt the metric Kibritçioğlu (2001) develops to identify crisis periods in the Turkish
economy. The author constructs an index of macroeconomic crisis using indices of real
Table 1 List of sample banks. Datastream provides listing and delisting dates of sample banks. Merger-
















Alternatifbank 7/18/1995 3/20/1996 Completed Anadolu Group 80%
7/18/1995 4/2/2002 Withdrawn Credit Agricole
Indosuez
100%
7/18/1995 11/15/2006 Completed Alpha Bank A.E. 50%
Demirbank 7/11/1990 9/27/2001





Finansbank 2/2/1990 4/3/2006 Completed National Bank
of Greece
46%
Dışbank 9/13/1990 4/12/2005 Fortis Bank 89.34%
Garanti
Bankası





Şekerbank 4/11/1997 6/22/2006 Completed Bank Turan
Alem Group
33.97%
TEB 2/18/2000 6/28/2004 Completed BNP Paribas 42.13%
Tekstilbank 5/23/1990
Toprakbank 6/25/1998 11/30/2001
Yapı Kredi Bankası 1/8/1988 1/7/2005 Completed Koçbank 57.43%
Yaşarbank 9/5/1990 12/21/1999
15 Numbers in YTL. For readers interested in converting to USD, Turkish Central Bank exchange rate on
December 29 2006 was 1.41 YTL per USD.
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industrial production, monthly inflation, and exchange rate. I generate an indicator of
macroeconomic crisis that takes on the value one in the years 1988, 1989, 1991, 1994,
1999, and 2001, and zero in all other years.
3 Results
I estimate the system of equations represented in Eq. (3) using FGLS. I allow for
heteroscedasticity in variances of small and large banks16. Table 3 reports the results of this
regression. Observations in the sample are annual until the end of 1996 and are quarterly
after 1996. This is why I estimate the system of equations using the full sample (the first
column of Table 3 reports results), the subsample from 1997 to 2006 (second column), the
subsample from 1988 to 1996 (third column), and the subsample that only covers end-of-
year data from 1988 to 2006 (fourth column).
The difference in annual versus quarterly reporting splits the sample into two subsamples
of nine and 10 years, respectively. There are 445 quarterly observations in the subsample
covering 1997 to 2006 and 62 annual observations in the subsample covering 1988 to 1996.
Furthermore, there are 160 large-bank and 285 small-bank observations in the subsample
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for sample banks. Panel A and B list mean market capitalization, book value
of assets and liabilities, and off-balance-sheet foreign-exchange-related items of small and large banks,





Panel A − Large Banks
İş Bankası 12,256 34,349 29,632 2,967
Akbank 9,901 29,540 25,830 5,846
Garanti Bankası 4,810 25,633 23,330 9,108
Yapı Kredi Bankası 4,668 23,167 20,631 4,488
Panel B − Small Banks
Denizbank 2,910 12,226 11,057 6,196
Finansbank 1,516 8,926 8,204 9,448
Dışbank 960 5,069 4,490 2,699
Demirbank 884 5,349 4,987 4,371
TEB 549 5,474 5,068 2,407
Esbank 272 3,732 3,439 1,241
Şekerbank 257 3,015 2,801 355
Toprakbank 242 4,945 4,729 1,860
Alternatifbank 215 1,670 1,557 2,623
Yaşarbank 209 3,576 3,376 7,061
Tekstilbank 165 1,562 1,431 1,999
Marbank 77 1,114 1,072 NA
16 In the SUR framework, contemporaneous correlation across groups is possible if the groups have equal
number of observations and share a common identifier (such as time or firm identity). In our sample, the
groups are unbalanced in their number of observations. This is why we cannot allow for contemporaneous
correlation across groups (Baum, 2006; STATA Press, 2005; Wooldridge, 2002).
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Table 3 Estimates of statistical market value accounting model for small and large banks with controls for
crisis periods. The following system of equations is estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares
(FGLS): MVk,it = Uk + ka,k * Ak,it + kl,k * Lk,it + kFX,k * FXk,it + Uk,crisis + ka,k, crisis * Ak,it * Icrisis+ kl,k,crisis *
Lk,it * Icrisis + kFX,k,crisis * FXk,it * Icrisis + ek,it, where k: L, S. The subscripts “L” and “S” stand for large and
small banks. MV is market value of net worth. A and L are book values of assets and liabilities. FX is book
value of off-balance-sheet foreign-currency related derivative contracts. U stands for hidden capital; ka, kl
and kfX stand for mark-up ratios of assets, liabilities and FX, respectively. Icrisis is an indicator for crisis years.
Values are in December-2006 million YTL. The first column reports results estimated on the full sample; the
second column on the subsample from 1997 to 2006; the third column on the subsample from 1988 to 1996;
and the fourth column on the subsample that covers end-of-year data from 1988 to 2006. Absolute values of
standard errors are in brackets. Significance levels are shown as *, ** and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and
1% significance
Full sample 1997–2006 1988–1996 Annual Data
US -304.71*** -360.22*** 91.08 -171.17
[69.59] [79.15] [68.20] [114.78]
ka,S 1.32*** 1.40*** -1.18* 1.80***
[0.31] [0.33] [0.65] [0.56]
kl,S -1.24*** -1.32*** 1.38** -1.78***
[0.34] [0.37] [0.69] [0.62]
kFX,S 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.04 0.05*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
US, crisis 274.61 254.6 16.57 183.61
[191.90] [237.68] [173.24] [287.03]
ka,S, crisis -0.8 -0.86 1.71 -1.15
[0.87] [0.92] [3.74] [1.44]
kl,S, crisis 0.79 0.86 -1.87 1.17
[0.93] [0.99] [4.10] [1.58]
kFX,S, crisis -0.05** -0.05** 0.36 0.02
[0.03] [0.03] [0.84] [0.07]
UL 2,705.93*** 3,696.82*** 1,044.42 996.09
[933.20] [1,123.16] [1,238.43] [1,447.91]
ka,L 1.16*** 1.04*** 5.71** 1.02
[0.34] [0.36] [2.90] [0.66]
kl,L -1.11*** -0.99** -6.08* -0.89
[0.40] [0.41] [3.15] [0.77]
kFX,L -0.04 -0.09 0.09 -0.05
[0.11] [0.12] [0.29] [0.20]
UL, crisis 2,863.95 15,019.41*** 1,841.75 4,952.50
[3,008.79] [5,024.89] [2,213.29] [4,087.37]
ka,L, crisis 2.41* 0.92 -0.04 4.10*
[1.35] [1.47] [11.33] [2.20]
kl,L, crisis -2.69* -1.48 -0.09 -4.84*
[1.56] [1.66] [12.12] [2.60]
kFX,L, crisis -0.23 -0.51* -0.43 1.06*
[0.26] [0.28] [0.96] [0.55]
Observations 507 445 62 170
Wald test 1319 1234 175 432
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covering 1997 to 2006 and 24 large-bank and 38 small-bank observations in the subsample
covering 1988 to 1996. The restriction in the number of observations in the sample covering
1988 to 1996 makes interpretation of results difficult in this subsample.
Differences in regulation and institutional structure of the ISE in the two periods (1988–
1996 and 1997–2006) affect the analysis. Market value of net worth is the measure of
“true” economic value. Markets must price stocks efficiently for market value of net worth
to reflect true economic value. The Turkish stock market is relatively young; it started
operations in 1986. Balaban and Kunter (1997) and Antoniou et al. (1997) find
inefficiencies in the ISE using data from 1988 to 1995. Furthermore, Antoniou et al.
(1997) show that following institutional and regulatory changes, the ISE becomes more
efficient in the latter part of their sample period. This is why one must be cautious in
interpreting estimates of SMVAM in the subsample covering years from 1988 to 1996.
Equation 3 disaggregates the market value of net worth into its bookable and unbookable
components. Mark-up ratios for assets, liabilities and foreign-currency-related derivative
transactions (ka, kl, and kFX) measure how investors mark up or down the value of these
booked items. As expected, asset and liability mark-up ratios prove positive and negative,
respectively, in all subsamples and bank groups except one. Asset mark-up ratio of small
banks in non-crisis periods for the subsample covering the years 1988 to 2006 prove
negative and insignificant. The small sample size and problems of market efficiency might
explain the contradictory mark-up ratios in this subsample.
Markets capitalize one YTL of small-bank asset or liability at more than its book value
in non-crisis periods and less than its book value in crisis periods. Results support the
hypothesis that economic crisis forces revelation of adverse information about small banks.
Consequently, investors mark-down the prices of small-bank assets and liabilities.
Markets judge one YTL of large-bank asset or liability at more than its book value in
both non-crisis and crisis periods. In contrast to small banks, security prices of large banks
are not depressed in times of crisis. Large banks may be less likely to hide adverse
information and consequently security prices may be less likely to be depressed. An
alternative explanation is that large banks are more skillful in hiding adverse information
about their securities in both crisis and non-crisis periods. Investors may also believe large
banks to be beneficiaries of Too-Big-To-Fail policies and do not mark-down large-bank
assets and liabilities.
The significance of mark-up ratios for foreign-exchange-related derivative transactions
indicates that investors take into account the foreign-currency exposure when pricing banks.
Negative mark-up ratios indicates short-positions in foreign currencies for large banks.
However, these positions are significant only in the 1999 and 2001 crisis-periods. In
contrast to large banks, small banks have positive and significant mark-up ratios in non-
crisis periods indicating long-positions in foreign currencies in the full sample and the
sample covering 1997 to 2006.
3.1 Transparency of financial statements
The significance of hidden capital for large banks in crisis and non-crisis periods and for
small banks in non-crisis periods indicates that unbookable components of net worth are
important. Hypothesis 1 holds that financial statements are transparent. If financial
statements are transparent, there should be no hidden capital and markup ratios should
equal unity. Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for tests of transparency that uses the full
sample, the subsample covering quarters from 1997 to 2006, the subsample covering years
from 1988 to 1996, and the subsample covering year-end data from 1988 to 2006.
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Financial statements of small and large banks prove opaque in non-crisis periods. In
crisis periods, I fail to reject the hypothesis of transparent statements for small banks in all
samples and for large banks in the subsample covering 1988 to 1996. Revelation of adverse
information in times financial crisis, forces transparency in small-bank statements. The
significance of hidden capital in both crisis (UL) and non-crisis periods (UL + UL,crisis)
explains why large bank financial statements prove opaque in crisis and non-crisis periods.
A heavier reliance on implicit and explicit safety nets in crisis periods relative to non-
crisis periods may explain the significance of hidden capital. Management (or large
shareholders who control management) may spread financial disinformation in order to
increase and protect opportunistic benefits at the expense of other stakeholders. In times of
crisis, all stakeholders learn of previously-concealed depletion in shareholder-contributed
capital. This revelation necessitates new infusions of shareholder-capital or an increased
reliance on the safety nets afforded by regulators.
Panel B of Table 4 investigates Hypothesis 2 which holds that banks need no new
infusions of capital in crisis periods either from government or from shareholders.
Alternative hypotheses maintain that banks may raise capital from shareholders and/or
increase their reliance on government guarantees. Governments may contribute significant
Table 4 Tests of hypotheses. Panels A through C report p-values and χ2 statistics for tests of Hypothesis 1
through 3, respectively. Panel A tests the hypothesis of transparent statements for small and large banks in
non-crisis and crisis periods (In non-crisis periods: Uk=0 and ka,k=1 and kl, k=-1. In crisis periods:
Uk + Uk,crisis=0 and ka,k + ka,k,crisis=1 and kl, k + kl, k,crisis=-1 where k: L, S. The subscripts “L, “S” stand for
large and small banks). Panel B tests whether the magnitude of hidden capital differs in crisis and non-crisis
periods (Uk, = U k,crisis where k : L, S.). Panel C tests whether SMVAM estimates of small and large banks
differ (US = U L, ka,S = k a,L and kl,S = k l,L in non-crisis periods. US + US,crisis = U L + UL,crisis,
ka,S + ka,S,crisis = k a,L + ka,L,crisis and kl,S + kl,S,crisis = k l,L + kl,L,crisis in crisis periods.). SMVAM estimates are
from Table 3. The first two columns report results for the full sample; the next two columns for the
subsample from 1997 to 2006; the next two columns for the subsample from 1988 to 1996; the next two
columns for end-of-year data from 1988 to 2006

















Panel A − Hypothesis 1 : Tests of transparency
Small banks in non-crisis periods 0.00 47.44 0.00 45.51 0.00 32.99 0.00 17.53
Small banks in crisis periods 0.79 1.05 0.78 1.10 0.64 1.69 0.99 0.12
Large banks in non-crisis periods 0.00 40.46 0.00 40.78 0.00 15.83 0.01 11.68
Large banks in crisis periods 0.00 35.46 0.00 45.73 0.13 5.69 0.02 10.03
Panel B − Hypothesis 2 : Estimates of hidden capital equal in crisis and non-crisis periods
Hidden capital of small banks 0.00 47.44 0.00 45.51 0.00 32.99 0.00 17.53
Hidden capital of large banks 0.79 1.05 0.78 1.10 0.64 1.69 0.99 0.12
Panel C − Hypothesis 3 : Estimates of hidden capital and mark-up ratios equal for small and large
banks
Hidden capital in non-crisis periods 0.00 10.35 0.00 12.98 0.44 0.59 0.42 0.65
Hidden capital in crisis periods 0.05 3.82 0.00 14.74 0.13 2.28 0.12 2.40
Asset and liability mark-up ratios in
non-crisis periods
0.41 1.81 0.18 3.44 0.07 5.39 0.67 0.81
Asset and liability mark-up ratios in
crisis periods
0.14 3.94 0.30 2.43 0.07 5.29 0.14 3.94
J Financ Serv Res (2010) 37:25–43 37
amounts of capital through implicit and explicit guarantees when shareholder-contributed
capital erodes. Government guarantees would not show up in financial statements but
would in unbookable assets, which are a component of hidden capital. If creditors rely on
government-contributed capital to increase in value when and if banks are threatened with
insolvency, I would expect that estimates of hidden capital would prove higher in crisis
periods relative to non-crisis periods.
Panel B of Table 4 reports #2-statistics and p-values for the test of difference in hidden
capital estimates in crisis and non-crisis periods. Hidden capital estimates for large and
small banks in crisis and non-crisis periods come from Table 3. Estimates of hidden capital
in crisis periods prove larger than estimates in non-crisis periods for both small and large
banks. Panel B shows that this difference is statistically significant for large banks in the
subsample covering 1997 to 2006.
Reregulation of the coverage of deposit insurance supports the hypothesis that
government guarantees become more important when banks are in trouble. Full-deposit-
insurance was instated following the 1994 and 2001 crises. Regulators tried to avert and/or
dampen the effects of the crises. Regulators explicitly increased the guarantees that banks
enjoyed at the exact time when infusions of capital were needed.
Table 5 investigates whether banks raise capital from shareholders more in crisis periods
relative to non-crisis periods. I collect annual data on paid-in capital for the period of 1991
to 2006 from the The Banks Association of Turkey and increases in capital from rights
issues for the whole sample period from the ISE.17 Table 5 reports the means, the t-statistics
and p-values for the tests of differences in means for paid-in capital, increases in paid-in
capital and increases in capital from rights issues. Unfortunately, the ISE provides data on
surviving banks only. There is, therefore, survivorship bias in the sample. The banks
excluded went bankrupt precisely due to the depletion in their capital base and their
inability to raise additional funds from shareholders. As such, the banks in the sample of
rights issues are the ones who are more likely to have raised capital from their shareholders.
Table 5 shows that paid-in capital decreases in crisis periods for both small and large
banks. Results indicate that shareholders provide more capital in crisis periods since
increases in paid-in capital and capital from rights issues prove higher in crisis periods than
in non-crisis periods. However, the changes in both the level and flow of paid-in capital
prove statistically insignificant. The survivorship bias in the rights issues sample indicates a
narrower difference between capital raised in crisis and non-crisis periods. To sum up, the
results provide no conclusive evidence that banks raise capital from shareholders to offset
decreases in net worth in times of crisis.
3.2 Impact of size on transparency and bank operations
Large and small banks may operate and book their operations in fundamentally different
ways (DeYoung et al. 2004; Berger et al. 2004). DeYoung et al. (2004) describe how
deregulation and technological change reshaped the competitive environment for small and
large banks in the US. The authors develop a simple model in which small and large banks
differentiate unit costs and product mix to compete. The last two decades saw a similar
17 TBB reports paid-in capital as “ödenmiş sermaye” and provides data on paid-in capital from 1991
onwards. Data on increases in capital from rights issues is available from Istanbul Stock Exchange at http://
www.imkb.gov.tr/sirket/sermaye_temettu.htm. Increases in capital from rights issues is the sum of increases
in capital from exercised pre-emptive rights and rights restricted to shareholders. Exercised pre-emptive
rights and rights restricted to shareholders are respectively, “rüçhan hakkı kullandırılan bedelli artırımlar” and
“rüçhan hakkı kısıtlanan bedelli artırımlar”.
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change in the Turkish competitive environment induced by deregulation and technological
change. This is why I control for bank size in estimating SMVAM.
Panel C of Table 4 investigates Hypothesis 3 which holds that small and large banks
operate and book their operations in similar ways. Panel C reports #2-statistics and p-values
for the test of equality in hidden capital and mark-up ratios for small and large banks. In the
full sample and the subsample covering quarters from 1997 to 2006, large- and small-bank
hidden capital is significantly different. According to Kane (2001) Too-Big-To-Fail policies
enable creditors to depend on the government to rescue large financial institutions when
and if they run into trouble. The findings suggest that markets perceive the four-large banks
to be benefiting from Too-Big-To-Fail policies. Panel C reports no significant difference
between the mark-up ratios of small and large banks. Findings indicate that small and large
banks record bookable assets and liabilities in similar ways. The differences between small
and large banks lie not in how they report their operations but in how regulators treat them.
As put forth by the Too-Big-To-Fail hypothesis, large banks enjoy credit enhancements
afforded by the Turkish government.
3.3 Mergers and changes in reporting standards
Reregulation in reporting standards and mergers may also affect the findings. First, banks
adopted new accounting measures to accommodate the effects of high inflation in 2001.
Financial statements from the fourth quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2002 used these
new measures. Second, the latter part of the sample period is marked by restructuring.
Table 1 shows that sixteen banks proposed eleven merger bids in the sample period. Nine of
the eleven bids took place from 2004 to 2006. Merger transactions may change operations
and reporting practices (Cornett et al. 2006). This is why mergers may affect transparency
of financial statements. This section discusses whether and how mergers and changes in
regulation affect the analysis.
I interpreted the time-variation in estimates of hidden capital as evidence of the
importance of government-provided capital in crisis periods. The change in accounting
measures may also explain the higher hidden capital estimates in crisis periods if inflation
accounting increases opaqueness. This does not seem to be the case since the stated purpose
of the change in accounting standards was to make financial statements more transparent.
Table 5 Sources of capital in crisis periods. Table tests whether banks raise capital from shareholders more
in crisis periods than in non-crisis periods. The Banks Association of Turkey provides data on paid-in capital
from 1991 to 2006. ISE provides data on increases in capital from rights issues. Values are in December-
2006 million YTL






Small banks Paid-in capital 214 156 1.69 0.09
Increase in paid-in capital 73 97 -1.16 0.25
Increase in capital from rights issues 42 56 -1.18 0.25
Large banks Paid-in capital 1,084 862 1.31 0.20
Increase in paid-in capital 348 477 -1.21 0.24
Increase in capital from rights issues 214 326 -1.28 0.22
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Table 6 Estimates of Statistical Market Value AccountingModel with controls for merger activity. The following
system of equations is estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS):MVk,it = αmerger * M it +Uk +
ka,k * Ak,it + kl,k * Lk,it + kFX,k * FXk,it + Uk,crisis + ka,k, crisis * Ak,it * Icrisis+ kl,k,crisis * Lk,it * Icrisis + kFX,k,crisis *
FXk,it * Icrisis + ek,it, where k: L, S. The subscripts “L” and “S” stand for large and small banks. MV is market
value of net worth. M is an indicator taking on the value 1 if bank i receives a merger bid in period t and 0
otherwise. A and L are book values of assets and liabilities. FX is book value of off-balance-sheet foreign-
currency-related derivative contracts. U stands for hidden capital; ka, kl and kfX stand for mark-up ratios of
assets, liabilities and FX, respectively. Icrisis is an indicator for crisis years. Values are in December-2006 million
YTL. First column of table reports results estimated on the full sample, the second column on the subsample
from 1997 to 2006, the third column on the subsample from 1988 to 1996, and the fourth column on the
subsample which covers the end-of-year data from 1988 to 2006. Absolute values of standard errors are in
brackets. Significance levels are shown as *, ** and ***, representing 10%, 5%, and 1% significance
Full sample 1997–2006 1988–1996 Annual Data
αmerger 834.40*** 878.85*** -201.5 667.80**
[142.00] [151.77] [179.59] [265.84]
US -327.51*** -387.10*** 104.47 -204.80*
[66.35] [75.10] [68.15] [113.15]
ka,S 1.10*** 1.17*** -1.26* 1.49***
[0.30] [0.32] [0.64] [0.56]
kl,S -1.02*** -1.09*** 1.46** -1.44**
[0.33] [0.35] [0.69] [0.62]
kFX,S 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.04 0.05*
[0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03]
US, crisis 297.41 281.49 3.18 217.24
[182.71] [225.12] [170.85] [281.28]
ka,S, crisis -0.58 -0.63 1.79 -0.84
[0.83] [0.87] [3.68] [1.42]
kl,S, crisis 0.56 0.63 -1.94 0.83
[0.89] [0.94] [4.03] [1.55]
kFX,S, crisis -0.05** -0.06** 0.36 0.02
[0.02] [0.03] [0.83] [0.07]
UL 2,750.87*** 3,740.54*** 1044.42 1026.05
[931.97] [1,121.63] [1,238.43] [1,445.43]
ka,L 1.18*** 1.07*** 5.71** 1.05
[0.34] [0.36] [2.90] [0.66]
kl,L -1.14*** -1.02** -6.08* -0.92
[0.40] [0.41] [3.15] [0.77]
kFX,L -0.05 -0.09 0.09 -0.05
[0.11] [0.12] [0.29] [0.20]
UL, crisis 2819.01 14,975.69*** 1841.75 4922.54
[3,004.72] [5,017.94] [2,213.29] [4,080.23]
ka,L, crisis 2.39* 0.9 -0.04 4.08*
[1.35] [1.47] [11.33] [2.20]
kl,L, crisis -2.66* -1.46 -0.09 -4.81*
[1.55] [1.66] [12.12] [2.59]
kFX,L, crisis -0.22 -0.51* -0.43 1.06*
[0.26] [0.28] [0.96] [0.55]
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However, I have no way of testing for the stand-alone effect of the change in accounting
standards.
Table 6 investigates whether and how mergers change results using an indicator (named
merger indicator) that takes on the value one if the bank receives or proposes a merger bid
in the year and zero otherwise. The coefficient for merger indicator is positive and
significant in all samples except the subsample that covers the years from 1988 to 1996.
The small number of observations in which the indicator is one (there is only one
announcement of a merger bid) may explain why the coefficient proves insignificant in this
subsample. Results indicate that investors judge mergers to be value enhancing. Including
the merger indicator does not qualitatively change the SMVAM estimates.
4 Conclusion
The Statistical Market Value Accounting Model disaggregates the ways in which
accounting values of net worth fail to accord with stock market estimates of the “true
economic value”. Because the Turkish economy experienced high volatility and
deregulation in the last two decades, Turkish commercial banks provide an ideal setting
in which to study transparency and explore sources of hidden capital.
Statements of sample banks prove opaque. One source of opacity is hidden capital.
Hidden capital increases in periods of crisis. I conjecture that the main component of hidden
capital is government-contributed capital, which increases in value in times of crisis. Crisis
necessitates infusions of capital. Banks may raise capital either from shareholders or from
government in the form of heavier reliance on implicit and explicit safety nets. Results
indicate that government-provided capital gains importance in crisis periods whereas there
is no significant evidence of capital-raising from shareholders.
Hidden capital is significantly more important for large banks than it does for small
banks. It is possible that large banks with their concentration in foreign-currency-related
contracts were in a vulnerable position and stood to benefit more from government-
contributed capital. If this is the case, large banks benefited from Too-Big-To-Fail policies.
Investors may also have judged the Turkish government to have insufficient capital to
rescue all insolvent institutions. In the sample period, TMSF closed five of the small banks
and none of the large banks. With capital constraints, the Turkish government might have
preferred to keep the largest banks afloat and promptly close the insolvent small banks.
Within the unique setting of the Turkish experience, possible sources of hidden capital
include off-balance-sheet transactions that pose significant risk (such as foreign-exchange
risk), and explicit and implicit forms of safety nets. Borrowers, depositors, regulators, banks
and taxpayers need to pay close attention to transparency when they evaluate each other’s
performance.
Regulators in many developing and developed countries responded to the challenges
posed by the sub-prime mortgage crisis by increasing the maximum level of deposit-
Table 6 (continued)
Full sample 1997–2006 1988–1996 Annual Data
Observations 507 445 62 170
Wald test 1437 1351 180 451
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insurance coverage18. Findings of this paper indicate that increasing insurance coverage in
times of crisis allows banks to rely on government-contributed capital instead of
shareholder-contributed capital. Relying on government contributed capital introduces
moral hazard problems and decreases the transparency financial statements. To combat the
problems of moral hazard, regulators and taxpayers need to identify the consequences of
distorted incentives. However, deposit insurance, that gives rise to moral hazard problems,
also decreases transparency of financial statements. This is why we, the taxpayers, and the
regulators need to be vigilant to ensure that the opaqueness in financial statements does not
hide the consequences of distorted incentives.
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